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2“[Security Council] decision[s] may bind all UN Member 
States, including ‘those members of the Security Council which 
voted against it and those Members of the United Nations who 
are not members of the Council.” 1
introduction
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (Resolution 1325) passed unanimously on October 31, 2000.2 The Preamble to Resolution 1325 
recognizes the disparate impact of armed conflict on women 
and girls. It further notes that understanding this impact informs 
“effective institutional 
arrangements to guar-
antee their protection 
and full participation 
in the peace process 
[which] can signifi-
cantly contribute to the 
maintenance and pro-
motion of international 
peace and security.”3 
The Resolution there-
fore imposes obliga-
tions on various actors 
on the international 
stage in an effort to 
promote and protect 
the rights and dignity 
of women and children 
during conflict.4 
Resolution 1325 
places three principle 
obligations on states and other relevant entities. Firstly, the 
Resolution seeks to ensure greater representation, participation, 
and involvement of women in peace-making processes, and 
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to include a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations.5 
Secondly, the Resolution calls for respect for humanitarian law 
with a special emphasis on ensuring better protection of women 
and girls, such as excluding impunity clauses, in order to better 
promote justice for female victims of conflict.6 The state must 
also take affirmative action to prevent third parties from abusing 
the rights of women and girls during armed conflict. Thirdly, it 
calls for the promotion of the rights of women and girls and their 
special needs during the process of repatriation, resettlement, 
reintegration, and reconstruction.7 Further, states have the duty 
not to interfere or act in any way that would compromise women 
and girls’ enjoyment of fundamental rights.
Since the passage of 
Resolution 1325, it has 
been dogged by con-
troversy regarding its 
binding nature. Some, 
particularly non-gov-
ernmental organiza-
tions, assert that it has 
binding force, while 
others, especially dip-
lomats, argue that it is 
a series of principles 
to guide state practice.8 
This article argues 
that the Resolution is 
legally binding because 
a Security Council 
resolution may be 
obligatory regardless 
of whether it is cre-
ated under Chapter VI or VII. The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has established a series of factors to analyze whether the 
Security Council intended for a resolution to be legally binding. 
These factors are: the language used in the resolution; prior ref-
erence establishing the importance of the subject matter through 
discussions, resolutions, or documents; and the binding charter 
provisions in the resolution.9 In addition to these factors, the 
author adds international law, which includes reference to, or 
reliance of the resolution on, treaties, jus cogens norms, cus-
tomary law, and other sources of international law. The ultimate 
purpose of this article is to provide all relevant stakeholders, 
including civil society organizations, with the tools necessary 
to ensure that states comply with the binding provisions of 
Resolution 1325 and thereby ensure better protection of women 
and girls during and after armed conflict.
Even if Resolution 1325 is  
solely a product of Chapter 
VI, there is no bright line rule 
establishing that Security Council 
resolutions created under Chapter 
VI are non-binding and that those 
under Chapter VII are binding.
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3impact on StatuS of reSolution 1325
The UN Charter does not use the term ‘resolution.’ UN prac-
tice places a generic meaning on the word, conveying a decision 
or a recommendation.10 Generally, a ‘decision’ is considered 
binding, while a ‘recommendation’ is deemed non-binding.11 
Yet, the meaning of a decision or a recommendation can change 
depending on context. Therefore, a rigid application of these dis-
tinctions leads to confusion, as some decisions are non-binding 
and some recommendations have the force of law.12
Article 25 of the UN Charter is key to understanding the 
obligatory nature of decisions made by the UN Security Council. 
It stipulates that, “[m]embers of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.”13 Article 25 is listed under 
Chapter V, entitled “The Security Council,” which addresses 
the composition, functions and powers, voting process, and 
procedures of the Security Council.14 Some scholars argue that 
Article 25 only governs Chapter VII, which addresses coercive 
measures.15 In other words, Security Council decisions are only 
binding when enforcement powers are invoked pursuant to a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggres-
sion.16 According to this view, the mandate of the Security 
Council under Chapter VI generally, and under Articles 33, 34 
and 36 in particular, is not binding.17 This argument is anchored 
in the belief that the Security Council’s Chapter VI role is lim-
ited solely to assisting Member States to reach a peaceful agree-
ment with as little intervention as possible.18 In this capacity, the 
Security Council could only make non-binding recommenda-
tions for peaceful dispute settlement.19 
Some practitioners contend that Resolution 1325 was passed 
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and that the provisions of 
Resolution 1325 are, at best, only morally binding.20 Alain-Guy 
Tachou-Sipowo, an international law scholar at the Université 
Laval in Québec, has asserted that “thematic resolutions do 
not impose the same binding obligations as those of decisions 
made in response to a threat to peace or international security”21 
since they are no more than “pale imitations of international 
conventions.”22 However, this view represents a narrow, restric-
tive interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions. With the 
evolution of the concept of security from the traditional state-
centric perspective to a broader human-centred approach, the 
notion of what constitutes a threat to the peace calls for a more 
liberal interpretation. As noted by Professor Stefan Talmon, of 
the University of Oxford’s Faculty of Law, 
An examination of the Council practice and the common  
understanding of the United Nations membership in 
general, shows that “threat to the peace” is a constantly 
evolving concept. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
the understanding of what constitutes a “threat to the 
peace” has broadened considerably from the narrow 
concept of the absence of the use of armed force, to the 
wider concept of situations that may lead to the use of 
armed force.23
Thus, the distinction between Chapters VI and VII is becoming 
blurred, encouraging a more liberal interpretation of Article 25 
as applied to resolutions created under non-coercive measures 
as well.
It is possible that Resolution 1325 was not passed solely 
under Chapter VI, where some of its articles reflect the influence 
of Chapter VII. Paragraph 6 of the Resolution, which concerns 
training for troops prior to deployment in conflict zones and post-
conflict situations, is a strong example of Chapter VII influence.24 
Deployment of troops normally takes place after the Security 
Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or acts of aggression and after the Security 
Council has taken a decision to deal with the situation.25 
can reSolutionS paSSed under chapter Vi be 
binding?
Even if Resolution 1325 is solely a product of Chapter VI, 
there is no bright line rule establishing that Security Council 
resolutions created under Chapter VI are non-binding and that 
those under Chapter VII are binding. Rosalyn Higgins, an 
international law scholar and former President of the ICJ, is a 
strong proponent of the position that Chapter VI resolutions can 
be binding. She has noted, for example, that “in certain limited, 
and perhaps rare cases, a binding decision may be taken under 
Chapter VI (just as non-binding resolutions may be passed under 
Chapter VII).”26 This view finds support in the ICJ’s advisory 
opinion in the Namibia Case.27 The Namibia Case addressed 
the legal consequences flowing from a series of UN Security 
Council resolutions calling on South Africa to cease its occupa-
tion of Namibia.28 Ultimately, the ICJ held that South Africa’s 
actions in Namibia were illegal, found that the Security Council 
resolutions were binding, and called on all states to refrain from 
any dealings with South Africa involving Namibia.29 In deter-
mining that the Security Council resolutions were binding, the 
Court held:
It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter 
applies only to enforcement measures adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not possible to find in 
the Charter any support for this view. Article 25 is not 
confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action 
but applies to “the decisions of the Security Council” 
adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, 
that Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but immedi-
ately after Article 24 in that part of the Charter, which 
deals with the functions and powers of the Security 
Council.30
The Namibia decision was confirmed in the 2004 Palestine Wall 
Case,31 in which the ICJ concluded that the respondent state 
had “contravened” numerous binding obligations imposed by 
multiple Security Council resolutions.32 None of the resolutions 
at issue in these cases were adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.33
Therefore, if Resolution 1325 was passed under Chapter VI, 
it is not necessarily non-binding. Rather, to determine the nature 
of Resolution 1325, a contextual approach is needed. Article 
24 grants the Security Council permission to act on behalf of 
UN member states to maintain international peace and security 
through the application of the powers covered under Chapters 
VI, VII, VIII and XII.34 A contextually based reading of Article 
25 in light of Article 24 demonstrates that Security Council reso-
lutions can be binding under Chapter VI decisions. 
4Looking at the scope of Article 25 application, the Repertory 
of Practice for the UN Charter has found that: 
[t]he Security Council has on no occasion defined the 
scope of the obligation incurred by Members of the 
United Nations under Article 25, nor has it expressly 
indicated on any occasion that a particular decision 
should or should not be considered as falling under 
that Article.35 
Marko Divac Öberg, a legal officer at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, similarly contends that “the 
binding effect of Security Council resolutions belongs to the 
realm of international peace and security and includes enforce-
ment under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but is not limited to 
that.”36 Higgins takes this one step further and asserts that the 
“travaux [preparatoires] of the UN Charter provide some evi-
dence that Article 25 was not intended to be limited to Chapter 
VII, or inapplicable to Chapter VI.”37 This position seems to be 
confirmed in the Namibia case, where it was noted that:
The decisions made by the Security Council  . . .  were 
adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 
and 25. The decisions are consequently binding on all 
[Member States] of the United Nations which are thus 
under obligation to accept and carry them out.38
Accordingly, Article 25 may apply to resolutions passed under 
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. Regardless of which chapter of 
the Charter applies to Resolution 1325, the binding nature of 
Article 25 should also apply, allowing for a binding obligation 
on states.39
doeS reSolution 1325 create  
legally binding obligationS?
If Article 25 applies to resolutions under Chapter VI, it is 
important to determine in which “limited, and perhaps rare, 
cases a binding decision may be taken under Chapter VI.”40 
The ICJ factors can help to clarify when the Security Council 
intended for such a resolution to be binding. The ICJ clearly 
established these factors in the Namibia case: 
The language of a resolution of the Security Council 
should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can 
be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature 
of the powers of Article 25, the question is to be deter-
mined in each case, having regard to the terms of the 
resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading 
to it, the Charter provision invoked and, in general, 
all circumstances that might assist in determining the 
legal consequences of the resolution of the Security 
Council.41
Thus, to determine the intent of the Security Council in creat-
ing a resolution, at least three factors need to be assessed: the 
language used in the resolution, the discussions leading to it, and 
the Charter provisions invoked.42 This article includes a fourth 
factor by addressing the invocation of international laws and 
norms, including the application of treaties, customary law and 
jus cogens norms, among others.
language
The language of resolutions can be categorized as either 
weak or strong. Weak language can indicate the non-binding 
nature of the resolution and strong language can indicate binding 
intent. Words such as “decide,” “declare,” and “call upon” are 
examples of strong language, while “urge,” “recommend,” and 
“encourage” are weak.43 Resolution 1325 uses a combination of 
weak and strong language. The weak language includes “urge” 
and “encourage.” For example, in Paragraph 2 the resolution 
“[e]ncourages the Secretary-General to implement his Strategic 
Plan of Action . . . ” while in Paragraph 3, the Secretary-General 
is urged to appoint more women as special representatives and 
envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf. On the other hand, 
among the strong language used is “call upon” and “call on,” 
which can also denote a binding obligation where the Security 
Council could use weaker language such as “recommend.” For 
example, under paragraph 8, the Resolution “[c]alls on all actors 
involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, 
to adopt a gender perspective . . . .”44 Furthermore, paragraph 9 
“[c]alls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully inter-
national law applicable to the rights and protection of women 
and girls as civilians.”45 Higgins notes that by using “call upon,” 
“the Council is in effect requiring the parties to note an obliga-
tion which they have already accepted under Article 33(1).”46 
Thus, the language used in Resolution 1325 has both strong and 
weak elements, whereby the assertion that the weak language of 
the Resolution makes it non-binding is insufficient.47
prior diScuSSionS and reSolutionS
The intent of the Security Council can also be determined by 
looking at the frequency of prior discussions and/or resolutions 
that ultimately led to the passage of the new resolution. In the 
Nuclear Weapons Case48 the ICJ noted that “a series of resolu-
tions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required 
Thus, to determine the intent of the Security Council 
in creating a resolution, at least three factors need to be 
assessed: the language used in the resolution, the discussions 
leading to it, and the Charter provisions invoked.
5for the establishment of a new rule.”49 Sir Michael Wood, a 
member of the International Law Commission, is also of the 
view that one can seek the intent of the Security Council by 
reference to its travaux préparatoires, which do not differ 
from a contextual, or an object and purpose, approach to 
interpretation.50 The travaux préparatoires are embedded in 
previous discussions and documents made in connection with 
the resolution in question. The Preamble to Resolution 1325 
recalls a number of UN-based documents that support the pre-
vision’s focus on women and girls.51 The Security Council’s 
prior engagement with the effects of conflict on children 
(Resolution 1261 and Resolution 1314) and civilians gener-
ally (Resolution 1265 and Resolution 1296) demonstrates a 
growing awareness in the global community of the impacts 
of conflict on vulnerable groups.52 Further, the Beijing 
Declaration,53 which addressed the importance of raising 
women’s status gen-
erally and engaging 
them in all areas of 
society, as well as the 
Outcome Document 
of the 2000 General 
Assembly Special 
Session convey 
the growing focus 
on women as the 
recipients of human 
rights.54 The preva-
lence of these docu-
ments help to form 
a strong foundation for Reso lution 1325 by demonstrating 
that the international community has been interested in and 
concerned about women and conflict issues for some time. 
Resolution 1325, therefore, is the product of multiple forums 
from which the importance of the legal status of women and 
girls in post conflict situations can be clearly demonstrated.
inVocation of un charter proViSionS
Another factor to be considered when determining the 
intent of the Security Council is the invocation of Charter 
provisions. In essence, this conveys the idea that the resolu-
tion is deriving its force and legal validity from the Charter, 
the mother document or constitution of the UN.55 One argu-
ment in favour of this proposition is the supranational status 
that the UN enjoys, which is derived from the Charter and 
permits authoritative decision-making without requiring con-
tinuous consent to affirm its validity or binding nature.56 
While Resolution 1325 does not contain a direct reference to 
a particular UN Charter provision, the Preamble “[b]ear[s] in 
mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council 
under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace 
and security,”57 A preamble serves as an interpretive guide 
to the intention of the Security Council in the creation of a 
resolution.58 The Preamble also references the Secretary-
General’s Strategic Plan of Action, which in turn references 
the Charter.59
inVocation of international normS
In the Namibia case, the ICJ also noted that recourse should 
be “in general, [to] all circumstances that might assist in deter-
mining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security 
Council.”60 Among these surrounding circumstances are the 
existing principal sources of international law, such as treaties, 
customary law, and jus cogens norms, which can provide guid-
ance as to whether the Security Council intended a resolution 
to be binding.61 Resolution 1325 evolved from, and builds on, 
previous treaty law commitments to protect and promote the 
rights of civilians in war zones and post-conflict contexts around 
the world. They include the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the UN Refugee Convention 
of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999, the UN 
Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 
of 1989 and the two 
Optional Protocols 
thereto of 2000, and 
the Rome Statute 
of the International 
Criminal Court.62 
Many of the state 
duties that Resolution 
1325 establishes are 
derived from these 
binding sources, and 
support their imple-
mentation with regard to women. Due to the binding nature 
of treaties on states parties, many of which have ratified these 
obligations, Resolution 1325 simply reinforces already binding 
obligations.
Resolution 1325 also reflects and partly codifies custo-
mary international law and jus cogens norms. Paragraph 9 
of Resolution 1325 specifically refers to international laws 
governing conflict, and codifies prohibitions of certain war 
crimes, while Paragraph 10 references sex and gender-based 
crimes, and codifies international law prohibitions of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. By incorporating 
jus cogens norms into a resolution, the Security Council reaf-
firms a commitment to accomplishing international peace and 
security through the furtherance of customary international 
law. Including these norms in Resolution 1325 may show that 
the Security Council believes that peace and security cannot 
be achieved where the interests and wellbeing of women and 
children are not mainstreamed in the conflict prevention and 
resolution efforts.
application of reSolution 1325  
by StateS and other actorS
The African Union both directly and indirectly endorses 
Resolution 1325 in the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
thereby indicating a regional commitment to the binding status 
of the Resolution.63 Moreover, since the passage of Resolution 
1325, the Security Council has taken concrete steps towards 
In sum, Resolution 1325 is binding 
because it authorizes acts that are 
intra vires the UN Charter and other 
international laws.
6integrating women’s roles in implementing peace and security 
into its deliberations, as well as to adopt other resolutions 
that emphasize particular aspects of Resolution 1325.64 Cora 
True-Frost, a legal scholar at Harvard Law School, asserts that 
“[r]esolution 1325 has had important impacts on behaviour at 
both the international and national levels.”65 She notes that 
between 1994 and the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, a 
paltry four percent of Security Council resolutions mentioned 
women, girls, or gender.66 This figure, however, increased to 
over 25 percent in recent years.67 In addition, the Security 
Council has invoked Resolution 1325 in over twenty-five 
binding Chapter VII situation-specific resolutions, including 
those on Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Burundi, and Sudan.68 
Several countries have taken action to affirm Resolution 
1325.69 A number of countries have adopted Resolution 1325 
into national laws or Action Plans.70 The Knesset (Israeli 
Parliament), for instance, in July 2005, passed an amendment 
to the Women’s Equal Rights Law, in the spirit of Resolution 
1325, authorizing the representation of women on public com-
mittees and ‘national policy shaping teams.’ The application 
of Resolution 1325 by a critical mass of actors supports the 
legally binding nature of the resolution because it demonstrates 
state and Security Council willingness to invoke and apply its 
provisions. 
concluSion
It is possible to infer the intent of the Security Council by 
relying on the language used, the discussions informing the 
formulation of a resolution, reference to Charter provisions, 
and international laws invoked and relied upon. Resolution 
1325 contains strong language in many of its provisions.71 The 
Resolution seeks to support women’s roles in promoting peace 
and security, objectives shared by the UN Charter. Additionally, 
Resolution 1325 is firmly grounded in, and reflects, several 
major treaties, customary law and jus cogens norms that regu-
late peace, security, conduct of war, and women and children’s 
rights. In sum, Resolution 1325 is binding because it authorizes 
acts that are intra vires the UN Charter and other international 
laws. Therefore, as we celebrate the 10th anniversary of the adop-
tion of Resolution 1325, it is important to highlight the positive 
achievements of resolution and the obligations on all relevant 
stakeholders to uphold and promote the rights of women and 
girls during armed conflict.
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